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This paper examines a topic of increasing interest, the potential determinants of extensive (i.e., 
number of firms) and intensive (i.e., average exports per firm) trade margins, using state-level 
trade to 190 countries.  In addition to distance and country size, other factors affecting trade costs 
and export demand are explored.  In state-by-state regressions, these other factors exhibit more 
consistent and statistically significant effects on the extensive than on the intensive trade margin.  
One noteworthy finding is that U.S. foreign direct investment has a positive effect on both 
margins.  In regressions using all state-level data simultaneously, some factors affect both 
margins, but not necessarily in the same way.  For example, the impact of the communications 
infrastructure in the importing country affects the extensive margin positively and the intensive 
margin negatively.  Finally, reasons for differences across states, such as state size and trade 
missions, are identified. 
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1. Introduction 
Relatively few firms export and these firms usually export to a small number of markets.
1  Not 
surprisingly, these exporting firms possess productivity advantages over non-exporting firms.  
The theoretical foundations for these results can be found in models of firm behavior, most 
notably in Melitz (2003), based on firm heterogeneity in productivity and on the costs of 
exporting.  One implication is that for firms exporting to a particular country a productivity 
threshold must be exceeded.  Moreover, this productivity threshold affects extensive (i.e., 
number of firms) and intensive (i.e., average exports per firm) trade margins. Interest in these 
margins, especially in the context of trade liberalization, is growing rapidly.
2  In this paper, I 
generate results concerning the determinants of these margins using firm data aggregated to the 
level of individual states.
3  Such results about the geography of trade are essential for 
understanding trade flows at the state level and can be useful for assessing related policies, such 
as the Obama Administration’s “National Export Initiative,” which has a goal of doubling U.S. 
exports over a five-year period beginning in 2010.
4
The extensive margin exists because a firm, if it is to be an exporter, must export at 
adequate quantities and at prices above variable costs to cover its fixed costs of exporting.
 
5
                                                 
1 Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007) stated that only four percent of the 5.5 million firms in the United 
States in 2000 were exporters.  Of this four percent, the top ten percent accounted for 96 percent of U.S. exports.  
Even restricting the focus to those industries that are more involved in producing tradable goods, such as 
manufacturing, mining, and agriculture, only 15 percent of U.S. firms were exporters.  A similar finding for French 
producers can be found in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004). 
  
2 Recent papers include Lawless (2010), Persson (2010), Buono and Lalanne (2010), Markusen (2010), Kehoe and 
Ruhl (2009), and Berthou and Fontagné (2008). 
3 We lack individual firm-level data but rather have firm-level data aggregated to the state level. 
4 See Cassey (2011) for a summary of the state export literature. 
5 These variable costs include all variable costs associated with exporting as well as production costs. 3 
 
Thus, increases in either fixed or variable trade costs should reduce the number of exporters.  
Relative to the intensive margin, however, predictions concerning the impact of variable trade 
costs are ambiguous.  For example, an increase in variable trade costs will reduce the quantity 
sold by firms exporting to a country, a change that can reduce total sales revenue and average 
sales per firm.  At the same time, an increase in variable trade costs will cause some exporters to 
exit the market, which tends to increase average sales per firm remaining in the market.  Thus, an 
increase in variable trade costs has an ambiguous effect on the intensive margin.  Meanwhile, an 
increase in fixed trade costs should be associated with an increase in average sales per firm.  The 
increase in fixed trade costs increases the sales necessary to make exporting profitable, so sales 
per firm should be related positively to fixed trade costs. 
This paper examines the potential determinants of how many firms in a state export to a 
specific country and the average sales of those firms to that country.  In addition to examining 
distance and foreign country (economic) size in explaining these trade margins, the impacts of 
many other factors are explored.  Ultimately, this analysis provides insights as to the importance 
and operation of geographically-based frictions.  I also explore whether U.S. foreign direct 
investment affects either trade margin.      
This paper is complementary to recent papers by Hillberry and Hummels (2008) and 
Lawless (2010).  The former paper examines firm-level trade flows within the United States, 
while I examine U.S. international trade flows at the state level.  Hillberry and Hummels (2008) 
find that the number of unique establishment/destination pairs declines sharply for distances up 
to 200 miles, with little decline thereafter.    They also find that the average value of a shipment 
declines with distance, but the decline over (ever-longer) short distances is minimal and then the 
declines becomes only slightly more pronounced over longer distances. 4 
 
Meanwhile, similar to Lawless (2010), this paper examines the number of firms exporting 
to a particular country as a function of country size and distance.  Lawless (2010) uses data for 
2006 on U.S. exports to 156 countries.  Following Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004), she 
decomposes exports to each country into the number of firms exporting (i.e., the extensive 
margin) and average export sales per firm (i.e., the intensive margin).
6
Similar to Lawless (2010), I estimate basic and extended gravity models using data from 
2006.  Rather than estimate the model at the national level, I estimate separate regressions for 
each state and for each trade margin using foreign destination size and distance from state to 
destination plus other variables capturing trade costs.  These other control variables include 
language, infrastructure variables, geographic variables, the ease of trading across borders, the 
destination’s legal environment, and the existence of both formal and informal networks.  This 
analysis decomposes the trade margins to the level of individual states and provides additional 
insights on Lawless’ (2010) findings, especially whether trade costs have a systematic impact on 
the intensive margin for some states.  In other words, her finding that trade costs have little effect 
on average exports per firm at the national level could hide the importance of trade costs for a 
subset of states. 
  With respect to country 
size, she finds a positive, statistically significant effect on both margins, with the magnitude 
larger for the extensive margin.  For distance, she finds a negative, statistically significant impact 
on both margins, with the (absolute) magnitude larger for the extensive margin.  She also finds 
that most proxies for trade costs affect only the extensive margin. 
                                                 
6 Lawless (2010) notes that alternative definitions of trade margins exist – see pages 1158-1159. 5 
 
In addition to using state-by-state data rather than national data, I differ from Lawless 
(2010) by examining exports to more foreign destinations.
7
The use of state-by-state data allows one to examine the similarity of coefficients for a 
specific independent variable across states.  In addition, the data allow for a single-equation 
estimation that allows us to focus on potential reasons for differences across states.  I show the 
importance of state size and provide evidence concerning the roles of geography and state export 
promotion policy. 
  The preceding differences lead to 
estimation issues for analyzing the extensive margin because frequently no firms in a state export 
to a specific destination.  Not surprisingly, smaller states tend to export to fewer destinations 
than larger states.  As a result, the approach used by Lawless (2010) ─ ordinary least squares 
with the natural log of the number of exporting firms as the dependent variable ─ is 
inappropriate for state-level data.  Thus, estimation techniques suited for handling zeros and non-
normal distributions of the dependent variable are used. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows.  Section 2 presents the theoretical 
model underlying the empirical analysis.  Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical 
analysis is described.  Section 4 discusses the estimated models and the results.  Section 5 
completes the paper with a summary of the key contributions of the analysis. 
2. Underlying Theoretical Model: Heterogeneous Firms and Trade Costs 
The underlying model can be found in Lawless (2010), the origins of which can be found in 
Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008).  Only the key points are highlighted.  Essential factors driving 
                                                 
7 The number of observations actually used in the regression varies due to limitations on the country coverage of 
independent variables.  The upper limit is 190; however, the sample size is smaller in most regressions. 6 
 
the results are that firms differ in their productivity and, in order to export, must incur fixed as 
well as variable export costs. 
  Begin by assuming that in each geographic unit (e.g., states in the United States and 
countries in the rest of the world), firms produce a continuum of separate differentiated products.  
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where  pj(k) is the price for good k in country j, Yj is the level of real income in country j, and Pj 
is the Dixit-Stiglitz price level in country j. 
  Within each exporting state a continuum of separate differentiated products, each with 
unit mass, are produced.  Each firm, using a Ricardian technology, produces one product at a 
cost-minimizing unit cost of c/a, where c depends on the exporting state’s cost level and a is a 
firm-specific productivity parameter.  This productivity parameter is a random variable drawn 7 
 
from a distribution G(a) with a ranging from zero to infinity.  Exporting firms incur fixed, Fj, as 
well as variable trade costs.
8
  In light of the preceding assumptions, the profit-maximizing sales price in country j for a 
good generated by a firm with technology level a is: 
  These variable trade costs are modeled as iceberg costs.  As a 














Profits and, therefore, sales will only occur in country j for firms exceeding the following 
productivity cutoff:  
 
















where μ = (∈ – 1)∈- 1∈
-∈.  Not surprisingly, this minimum productivity level increases with higher 
trade and domestic cost levels and decreases with higher real income and price levels in the 
destination country. 
                                                 
8 Lawless (2010) views the export-related costs associated with paperwork, marketing, and distribution chains as 
fixed costs, but also recognizes the some portion of these costs might be variable as they likely increase with the 
scale of exporting.  Additional variable costs include transportation costs and import duties.  8 
 
  Next, equations for the intensive and extensive margins can be derived.  Total exports 
from firm i to country j can be determined using the profit-maximizing price from equation (3) 
and demand from equation (2).  After some manipulation, total exports, sij, are as follows: 
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The preceding equation shows that a firm’s export sales are affected positively by its 
productivity and the export country’s income and negatively by its variable export costs.  To 
obtain total export sales to country j from a specific state, one simply adds the export sales by all 
firms whose productivity exceeds the productivity threshold: 
 
(6)                                           () () .
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  By taking the derivative of equation (6) with respect to trade costs one finds two key 
ways that a state’s total exports to a country are affected. 
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The first part of the expression on the right-hand-side of equation (7) captures the change in sales 
for firms already exporting (i.e., those already exceeding the productivity threshold) and the 
second part captures the change in the threshold.  Note that a change in variable trade costs 
affects both parts of the expression.  An increase in variable trade costs causes export sales to 
decline by reducing the sales of existing exporters and by increasing the productivity threshold.  
Meanwhile, an increase in fixed trade costs does not affect sales of existing exporters, but it may 
reduce sales by increasing the productivity threshold that might lead firms to cease exporting. 
  Total exports can be expressed as the product of the number of export firms and the 
average exports of these firms.  The number of export firms, Nj, follows directly from equation 
for the productivity cut-off: 
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  The change in the number of firms in response to a change in trade costs follows directly: 
 











Equation (9) illustrates that an increase in trade costs leads to a decline in the number of 
exporters by increasing the productivity threshold. 10 
 
  The ratio of the equations for total exports (equation (6)) and number of exporters 
(equation (8)) yields average exports per firm.  How average exports per firm are affected by 
trade costs can be expressed as follows: 
 













Fixed and variable trade costs can have different effects on average exports per firm.  The 
intuition underlying the effect of an increase in fixed trade costs is straightforward.  An increase 
in fixed trade costs increases the productivity threshold.  The increase in the productivity 
threshold eliminates low-sales firms.  Thus, the average sales of the remaining firms rise.  An 
increase in variable trade costs has a similar effect on the productivity threshold and causes 
marginal firms to exit the market; however, an increase in variable trade costs has an additional 
effect that is not present with an increase in fixed trade costs.  An increase in variable trade costs 
adversely affects the sales of firms remaining in the market.  Thus, there are two opposing effects 
on average export sales per firm; the net effect of an increase in variable trade costs is 
ambiguous. 
The implications of the preceding discussion can be summarized succinctly.  The number 
of firms in a state exporting to a specific country should be related positively to the country’s 
income and negatively to the fixed and variable trade costs associated with the country.  11 
 
Definitive predictions with respect to average sales per firm are problematic.
9
Finally, Lawless (2010) also points out that the impact of an increase in income in the 
foreign market raises total exports to the country; however, the effect on average exports per firm 
is ambiguous.  By inducing the entry of new firms, it is possible that average exports per firm 
may increase, decrease, or remain unchanged.   
  While a decrease 
in variable trade costs tends to increase the sales of existing exporters, decreases in fixed as well 
as variable trade costs induce firms to begin exporting.  The result is an ambiguous effect on 
average exports per firm. 
 3. Data 
The analysis in this paper is focused on two dependent variables ─ one for the extensive 
margin and one for the intensive margin ─ and their relationships with numerous independent 
variables.  Given 50 states and 190 countries in the sample, the maximum number of unique 
observations for a variable is 9500.  However, frequently the number of observations is less than 
9500 because some variables are only available at the state or country level and some values for 
variables are withheld for confidentiality reasons.  The variables, which pertain to 2006 unless 
otherwise indicated, are listed and defined in Table 1.  Summary statistics for these variables are 
contained in Table 2.  All data using dollars are denominated in 2005 U.S. dollars.  In addition, 
to assist in the comparisons of results, the theoretical relationships discussed below as well as 
Lawless’ (2010) results are summarized in Table 3. 
                                                 
9 Lawless (2010) does point out that more specificity about the heterogeneity of productivity can yield precise 
predictions about the impact of variable trade costs. 12 
 
For the dependent variables ─ the number of firms and their average export sales by 
country ─ the paper relies on the U.S. Census Bureau’s Profile of U.S. Exporting Companies.  
Rather than the nation as a whole as the basic geographic unit, I use the number of firms in an 
individual state s exporting to a specific country c, Firmss,c, and the average exports of those 
firms to a specific country, Exportsperfirms,c.  This departure from Lawless (2010) has an 
implication because a firm with plants in different states could export to a given country from 
plants in different states.  As a result, summing the number of exporters over all states will likely 
exceed the number of exporters at the national level.
10
Turning to the independent variables, variables to capture market demand and trade costs 
in export destinations are used.  Based on the theoretical model, recall that the impact of these 
variables on the number of firms is definitive, but the impact of these variables on average 
exports per firm is ambiguous. 
  The state focus also produces numerous 
state-country pairs (1646 in total) that have a value of zero.  In addition, 2190 observations for 
total exports, Exportss,c, and average exports, Exportsperfirms,c, are withheld for confidentiality 
reasons when only a small number of a state’s firms export to a given country.  
Starting with demand, this paper uses the gross domestic product of the destination 
country for a state’s exports, GDPc, as a proxy for market size.  A second variable possibly 
affecting the demand for exports of U.S. producers, not used in Lawless (2010), relates to U.S. 
foreign direct investment in the destination market, FDIc.  Through various demand, as well as 
cost, mechanisms, trade can be affected by the internal networks of multinational firms.
11
                                                 
10 Also, a firm with plants in multiple states might export to different countries depending on the plant.  If one were 
to sum exporters over all countries, then this sum would exceed the number of exporters at the national level. 
  
11 See Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010) for additional discussion of intra-firm trade and product 
contractibility. 13 
 
Whether this foreign direct investment will affect trade flows measured at the state level and 
whether foreign direct investment is a complement (i.e., positive) or a substitute (i.e., negative) is 
uncertain on theoretical grounds.  Moreover, this uncertainty also extends to the extensive 
margin as it is possible that increased foreign direct investment might be associated with a 
smaller number of exporting firms in a state. 
All other independent variables can be thought of as proxies for trade costs.  These 
proxies include measures associated primarily, but not exclusively, with geography (i.e., natural 
trade frictions) as well as those that result from government policies (i.e., unnatural or man-made 
trade frictions).  Given that a gravity model provides the foundation for the analysis, I include a 
distance measure that is the distance from the largest city in an exporting state to the largest city 
in the importing country, Distances,c, based on data from the CEPII Research Center.  
Transportation costs should increase the farther the distance between a state and a country. 
Another variable thought to affect trade costs, expressed as a 0/1 dummy, is whether the 
export destination uses English as an official language, Englishc.  If the destination country also 
uses English as an official language, trade costs should tend to be lower because of increased 
ease of communication with U.S. exporters.  In addition to language, I examine the impact of 
two communication infrastructure variables.  Phonesc is the number of mobile cellular 
subscriptions per 100 people in country c and Internetc is the number of internet users per 100 
people in country c.  Higher values of both of these variables should make it easier to acquire 
information and transact business. 
Two geographic variables thought to affect trade costs ─ population density, Popdensityc, 
and area, Landareac are examined.  These variables might capture the internal geography of the 14 
 
export destination that affects the costs of serving the market.  Countries with larger population 
densities or smaller geographic areas should tend to have lower trade costs because of lower 
distribution network and internal transportation costs. 
Trade costs are also affected by government policies and actions.  TradeFreedomc is an 
index that measures the extent to which trade goods are unaffected by tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers.
12  Higher values of this index correspond to less burdensome and costly trade 
impediments.
13
In addition to tariffs and non-tariff barriers, governments can affect the costs of trading 




                                                 
12 This index is a product of the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal.  For details on the construction of 
this index, go to 
  First, there are documents that must be completed as part of 
processing imports at the port of entry.  The number of required documents per imported 
shipment, Tradedocumentsc, includes the documents required by various entities, such as 
government ministries, custom authorities, port and container terminal authorities, health and 
technical control agencies, and banks.  Second, time is required to move a shipment from arrival 
through the port.  This time, denoted by Timeprocessc, is in terms of the number of calendar 
days.  Third, there are fees associated with the process of crossing the border.  Tradefeesc are the 
official, administrative fees of importing, excluding tariffs and trade taxes.  These fees 
encompass various costs, such as the costs for documents, administrative fees for customs 
clearance and technical control, customs brokers’ fees, terminal handling charges, and costs for 
www.heritage.org/index/Trade-Freedom. 
13 A trade restrictiveness index is the preferred index from a theoretical perspective, but the trade freedom index is 
available for more countries.  See Coughlin (2010) for an elementary discussion of trade restrictiveness indices. 
14 Each of these variables is generated by the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey.  See Djankov, Freund, and 
Pham (2010). 15 
 
inland transportation.  Larger values of each of these measures should be related positively to 
trade costs. 
This paper also considers two measures of governance because stronger legal institutions 
might facilitate international trade.  First, the rule of law, Legalc, measures the confidence of 
agents in the legal system.  Included in this measure is the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  A 
second measure, CorruptionControlc, focuses on corruption.  This measures the perceptions of 
agents about the extent to which public power is used for private gain and the effective capture 
of government by elites and private interests.  For both measures, higher values indicate better 
governance and, thus, should reflect lower trade costs. 
The final trade cost variable follows directly from the literature examining the effect of 
information networks on trade.  At the state level, empirical analysis has frequently found a 
positive connection between a state’s exports to a specific country and the state’s number of 
residents born in that country.
15
4. Estimation and Results 
  Trade from a state to a country might be less costly the larger 
the number of residents in a state that were born in the destination country, Foreignborns,c. 
As discussed previously, I estimated separate models of the extensive and intensive trade 
margins for each state.
16
                                                 
15 See Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin, and Wall (2008) and Coughlin and Wall (2011).  The latter paper finds evidence 
that ethnic networks are associated with increased trade on the intensive margin but not on the extensive margin. 
  Because the underlying distributions of the number of exporting firms 
16 I also estimated models with total exports as the dependent variable.  See the appendix. 16 
 
per country and the exports per firm are much different, the appropriate estimation technique 
also differed.  This section begins by discussing the extensive margin. 
Estimation of the Extensive Margin 
  For the estimation of the extensive margin, this paper estimates models based on count 
data.  Two standard models used in the estimation of count data are the Poisson model and the 
negative binomial model.  In the present analysis, I do not estimate Poisson models; however, 
understanding the basics of the Poisson model is useful for the subsequent analysis. 
In Figure 1 a representative histogram is shown.  Along the horizontal axis, the number 
of firms in Arkansas exporting to each of 190 countries is shown.  Along the vertical axis, the 
density of the number of firms is shown.  In Arkansas, there are no exporting firms for 53 of the 
190 countries.  The general shape of the density function is consistent with a Poisson distribution 
as the density generally declining as one moves rightward along the horizontal axis.  This general 
shape is also demonstrated by larger states; however, much less density is associated with the 
smallest numbers on the horizontal axis. 
Assuming a Poisson distribution is appropriate for an outcome Y (e.g., the number of a 
state’s firms that export to a specific country), the probability of observing any count, y, is: 
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where λ is the population rate parameter.  This population rate parameter is both the mean and 
the variance of the Poisson random variable Y.  17 
 
  In the present case, for a given state I am examining the number of the state’s firms 
exporting to numerous countries c (c=1...n) and, if a Poisson distribution were appropriate, the 
explained variables Y1, Y2,…Yn would have independent Poisson distributions with parameters λ1, 
λ2, …λn.  In a Poisson regression, the goal is to estimate how the Poisson distribution changes as 
a function of explanatory variables.  The standard assumption is that the λc are log-linearly 
dependent on a set of explanatory variables.  Thus,  
(12)                                                  ln cj x λβ ′ =  
 
where β is a parameter vector to be estimated and xj is a vector of observable characteristics 
(including a constant) that influences the number of firms exporting to a country.  
  However, as highlighted above, the Poisson model imposes the restriction that the 
dependent variable’s mean and variance equal λc.  Almost without exception, histograms, such as 
the one shown in Figure 1, as well as statistical tests indicate that the variance greatly exceeds 
the mean.  Thus, rather than estimate a Poisson model, I estimate the following negative 
binomial model: 
(13)                                  ln c jj x λβ ε ′ = +  
 
where εj is gamma distributed with mean 1.0 and variance alpha.  This allows the variance to 
exceed the mean.  One final point concerning my estimation is that the independent variables are 
generally expressed in natural logarithms, so the estimated coefficients are often elasticities. 18 
 
Extensive Margin: Results 
  Three sets of results are presented.
17  The first set provides the results associated with a 
simple or benchmark gravity model that includes as independent variables only the gross 
domestic product of the importing country, GDPc, and its distance from the exporting state, 
Distances,c.
18  The second set of results, based on an extended gravity model, incorporates 
explanatory variables that provide additional insights.
19
  Simple Gravity Model – Estimates by State.  The extensive-margin results for the 
simple gravity model are presented in Table 4.  In summary, the results for the individual state 
regressions matched expectations.  Using 190 observations for each state, the pseudo R
2 values 
ranged from .10 in Florida to 0.26 in Wyoming.  The dispersion parameter, which provides a test 
of the negative binomial model versus a Poisson model, was statistically significant for 38 of the 
50 states.  The results for GDPc and Distances,c are consistent with expectations and with 
Lawless (2010).  For each state, GDPc is a positive, statistically significant determinant of the 
number of exporting firms, while Distances,c is a negative, statistically significant determinant.  
The mean estimate for the coefficient on GDPc is 0.75, with a range from 0.59 for Florida to 0.87 
for New Hampshire.  This mean estimate is slightly larger than Lawless’ (2010) estimate of 0.65.  
Meanwhile, the mean estimate for the coefficient on Distances,c is -1.20, with a range from -4.24 
  These first two sets of results are based 
on separate regressions for each state.  This approach allows the parameter estimates for the 
independent variables to vary across states.  A third set of results is generated by estimating one 
regression using all states.  Controls are included to account for differences across states. 
                                                 
17 All regressions were re-run with robust standard errors.  Overall, the results were virtually unchanged. 
18 Because this estimation uses one export state, the effect of the state’s gross product is captured in the constant. 
19 I have chosen to be highly selective in discussing results.  Because groups of candidate explanatory variables are 
strongly correlated, the use of alternative variables produces very similar results in most cases.  19 
 
for Hawaii to -0.54 for New Hampshire.  This mean estimate is slightly larger in absolute value 
than Lawless’ (2010) estimate of -1.06.  Other relatively large (in absolute value) coefficients are 
estimated for Alaska (-2.27) and Florida (-1.99). 
  Extended Gravity Model – Estimates by State.  Turning to the extensive-margin 
results listed in Table 5 for the extended gravity model, one sees a richer set of results.  Once 
again, the results for the individual state regressions matched expectations and were consistent 
with Lawless’ (2010) findings.  Here the sample size was 137 because some independent 
variables were unavailable.  The pseudo R
2 values ranged from 0.12 in Florida to 0.35 in 
Montana.  The dispersion parameter was statistically significant in every state but Alaska. 
  The results for the independent variables are summarized in Table 6.  For each state, 
identical to the results for the simple gravity model, GDPc is a positive, statistically significant 
determinant of the number of exporting firms, while Distances,c is a negative, statistically 
significant determinant.  Relative to the coefficient estimates for the simple gravity model, the 
coefficient estimates tend to be absolutely smaller.  The mean estimate for the coefficient on 
GDPc is 0.46, with a range from 0.27 for Florida to 0.60 in New Mexico.  Meanwhile, the mean 
estimate for the coefficient on Distances,c is -0.81, with a range from -3.48 for Hawaii to -0.29 in 
New Hampshire.
20
  Turning to the additional independent variables, U.S. foreign direct investment in a 
destination country, FDIc, is positively related to the number of state exporters.  This variable, 
whose parameter estimates ranged from 0.08 for North Dakota and Virginia to 0.27 for 
 
                                                 
20 For Lawless’ (2010) preferred extended gravity model, the coefficient on GDPc is 0.53 and on Distances,c is -1.01. 20 
 
Wyoming, with a mean of 0.17, was statistically significant for every state.  This result suggests 
a complementarity between state exporters and U.S. foreign direct investment. 
On the cost side, destinations in which English is an official language, Englishc, seem to 
contribute to an increased number of state exporters.  This finding is consistent with Lawless 
(2010).  For 49 of 50 states the estimated parameter is positive, with statistical significance in 36 
(i.e., 72 percent) of these 50 cases.  Coefficient estimates for this variable ranges from -0.05 for 
Delaware to 0.79 in Montana, with a mean of 0.34.   
Similar to Lawless (2010), an increased number of state exporters also tends to be 
associated with more developed communications infrastructure.  The number of mobile cellular 
subscriptions per 100 people, Phones, is generally associated with more exporters.  The mean 
estimate is 0.06.  For 37 of 50 states the estimated parameter is positive; however, in only 16 was 
this relationship statistically significant.  Meanwhile, of the 13 states with a negative estimate, 
only one was statistically significant.
21
 The results for a geographic variable, Popdensity, are similar to those in Lawless (2010) 
and similar to the results for the communications infrastructure.  The mean coefficient estimate is 
0.05.  For 39 of 50 states the estimated parameter is positive, with 18 cases of statistical 
significance.  Of the 11 states with a negative estimate, two were statistically significant.
 
22
                                                 
21 When included as a replacement for Phones, Internet produces similar, but weaker results. 
 
22 When replacing Popdensity, Landarea tends to have a negative impact, often statistically significant.  Overall, 
however, Popdensity yields better results. 21 
 
Finally, also similar to Lawless (2010), higher levels of official, administrative fees, 
Tradefees, decrease the number of state exporters.
23  All 50 states exhibit a negative sign, with 
49 being statistically significant.  The mean coefficient estimate is -0.52, ranging from -0.73 for 
Oregon and South Dakota to -0.22 for Texas.
24
  Estimates Using all State Data Simultaneously.  In addition to estimating a separate 
regression for each state’s extensive margin, I combined all the states and estimated a single 
regression.  Thus, the coefficient estimates for the independent variables are assumed to be equal 
for all states.  Two approaches are use to account for differences across states.  One approach 
includes gross state product, GSPAs, as an independent variable, while a second approach 
includes state fixed effects to capture differences across states.  What explains the variation of 
the fixed-effects estimates across states is addressed at the end of this section. 
 
  The results of estimating the extensive margin using state-level data simultaneously for 
both the simple and extended gravity models are listed in Table 7.  Column (1) lists the results 
for the simple gravity model using gross state product.  Not surprisingly, larger states tend to 
have more exporting firms.  In other words, gross state product is a positive, statistically 
significant determinant of the number of exporters.  The rest of the results are also not surprising.  
Gross domestic product of the importing country, GDPc,  is a positive, statistically significant 
determinant of the number of exporters.  The coefficient estimate, 0.74, is almost identical to the 
mean estimate when the states are estimated separately.  The distance between the importing 
country and exporting state, Distances,c, is a negative, statistically significant determinant of the 
                                                 
23 A similar conclusion pertains to related measures for the costs of trading across borders. 
24 Attempts to control for the legal environment in the destination country failed to produce results that were 
statistically significant.  A similar comment applies to the possible impact of ethnic networks. 22 
 
number of exporters.  The coefficient estimate, -1.05, is somewhat smaller (in absolute terms) 
than the mean of the 50 states, -1.20. 
  Turning to the extended model, no surprising results appear in column (2) of Table 7.  All 
variables exhibit their expected sign and are statistically significant.  The coefficient estimates 
tend to be very close to the mean estimates of the 50 states.  Relative to the results in column (1), 
the coefficient estimate for gross state product is virtually unchanged.  Meanwhile, the (absolute) 
coefficient estimates for both gross domestic product and distance decline.  The estimate for 
gross domestic product declines from 0.74 to 0.46, while the estimate for distance declines from 
-1.05 to -0.83. 
  The results in columns (3) and (4) show the effects of replacing gross state product with 
dummy variables for each of the states using Wyoming as the base.  Note that the coefficient 
estimates and statistical significance are virtually identical when one compares the results in 
column (3) with column (1) and the results in column (4) with column (2). 
  The estimates for the coefficients for the state dummy variables are not reported, but are 
available upon request.  A comparison of these results for the models in columns (3) and (4) are 
nearly identical as the simple correlation is virtually one.  These estimates naturally lead to the 
question of what explains the difference across states.  To answer this question, I ran regressions 
to see what state characteristics were driving the results.  The independent variables used in these 
regressions are listed and defined in Table 8.
25
                                                 
25 With one exception, each variable can be found using standard reference sources, such as the U.S. Census Bureau.  
The exception is Trademission, which was provided by Andrew Cassey in private correspondence.  
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  I began by running a bivariate regression using gross state product as the independent 
variable to explain the fixed-effects estimates generated by the regression reported in column (4) 
of Table 7.  The results are reported in column (1) of Table 9.  Obviously, state size, GSPAs, is a 
key determinant explaining over 60 percent of the variation.  Next, I explored the effects of other 
potential determinants.  A set of representative results are reported in column (2) of Table 9. 
  A number of measures attempting to capture the skill levels in a state were used.  Neither 
of the two measures of educational attainment, School1s and School2s, was found to be 
statistically significant.  However, per capita gross state product, GSPAPCs, was found to be a 
negative, statistically significant determinant.  Thus, relative to other states, higher per capita 
levels of gross state product tend to be associated with fewer state exporters.  Recall that the 
examination of exporters in this paper does not include exporters of services. 
  A number of geographically-based measures of state characteristics were also examined.  
The results showed that states with a coastline, Coasts, did not have any favorable effect on the 
number of state exporters; however, states with either a land or water border with either Canada 
or Mexico were found to have an unfavorable effect on the number of exporters.  This latter 
result is somewhat surprising in light of all the trade activity that flows through certain states, 
such as Texas.  Finally, I found that states with higher levels of population density, Popdensitys, 
tended to have more exporters. 
  Our last finding is that state foreign trade missions, Trademissions, tended to have a 
positive effect on the number of exporters.  Thus, state government actions appear to stimulate 
export involvement.  However, this finding does not necessarily imply that such actions pass a 
cost-benefit test.  24 
 
Estimation of the Intensive Margin 
  The estimation of the intensive margin uses an ordinary least squares model, similar to 
Lawless (2010).
26
Intensive Margin: Results 
  For comparability with the results for the extensive margin, the same 
independent variables are examined using both simple and extended gravity-based models.  In 
addition, a third set of results is generated by estimating the basic and extended models across all 
states, with either gross state product or state fixed effects to account for non-random variation 
across states. 
  Similar to the preceding discussion of results for the intensive margin, three sets of 
results are presented.  The first set provides the results associated with a simple gravity model 
that includes as independent variables only the gross domestic product of the importing country, 
GDPc, and its distance from the exporting state, Distances,c.  The second set of results, based on 
an extended gravity model, incorporates additional explanatory variables that provide further 
insights concerning average exports from a state to specific countries.  The third set of results is 
generated by estimating one regression using all states. 
  Simple Gravity Model – Estimates by State.  The results for the simple gravity model 
are listed in Table 10.  Because the dependent variable is a state’s average exports per firm to a 
country and a given state is unlikely to export to all states, the number of observations for these 
                                                 
26 Based on Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), negative binomial models were also estimated.  Relative to the 
reported results, few differences were found. 
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regressions varies substantially across states.
27
  Turning to the results, the adjusted R
2 range is from 0.09 in North Dakota to 0.72 in 
Vermont.  Generally speaking, the adjusted R
2 is, at least, 0.40.  Only eight states have an 
adjusted R
2 less than 0.40.  Recall that the discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of our 
estimation did not provide strong expectations concerning the signs of any of the independent 
variables.  The results based on the simple gravity model indicate that GDPc is positively related 
to a state’s average exports.  For each state the estimated sign is positive, with statistical 
significance in 49 cases.  The estimated coefficient ranges from 0.21 in North Dakota to 0.71 in 
West Virginia.  The mean estimate is 0.46, which is somewhat larger than the estimate of 0.29 
produced by Lawless (2010) using national data.
  Even if exports occur, information for a specific 
state-country pair might not be available for confidentiality reasons.  As a result, the sample size 
ranges from 19 in Wyoming, a small state, to 185 in California, a large state. 
28
Meanwhile, the estimated sign for Distances,c is generally negative (e.g., 46 of 50), but is 
statistically significant in only 29 of the 46 states.  Generally speaking, these estimates fall 
between -1.00 and zero; however, Alaska exhibits an estimate of -2.11 and Hawaii shows an 
estimate of -1.74.  Statistical significance was not found in any of the four cases of an estimated 
positive sign.  The mean estimate is -0.41, which is (in absolute value) larger than the estimate of 
-0.26 produced by Lawless (2010).  Part of the difference can be attributed to the estimates for 
Alaska and Hawaii, which assume a greater weight in the state calculations than they do in 
 
                                                 
27 For the extended gravity model, the number of observation also varies because of missing values for some 
independent variables.   Here the sample size ranges from 19 in Wyoming to 135 in California. 
28 See Table 3 in Lawless (2010). 26 
 
Lawless (2010).  Potentially, the use of state data should generate more accurate estimates 
because of more accurate measures of distance.
29
  Extended Gravity Model – Estimates by State.  Turning to the results for the extended 
model presented in Table 11 and summarized in Table 12, the inclusion of more explanatory 
variables adds very little to understanding the intensive margin.  The number of statistically 
significant results for GDPc and Distances,c declined relative to the simple model.  For GDPc, the 
number of statistically significant cases declined from 49 to 45, while the decline was from 29 to 




None of the additional variables produces results that are consistently statistically 
significant.  Only FDIc and Popdensityc exhibit a consistently positive impact on average exports 
per firm, but FDI is statistically significant in roughly 69 percent (31 of 45) the cases and 
Popdensityc is statistically significant in roughly 41 percent (16 of 39) of the cases.  Meanwhile, 
Englishc, Phonesc, and Tradefeesc are frequently negative, but rarely statistically significant.
  For example, the mean of the parameter estimates for GDPc was 0.31, 
while the estimate in Lawless (2010) was 0.36.  For Distances,c, the mean estimate of -0.35 was 
identical to the one in Lawless (2010).  Note also that relative to the coefficient estimates for the 
simple gravity model, the coefficient estimates tend to be absolutely smaller. 
31
                                                 
29 Lawless (2010) assumes all exports move from Washington, D.C. to the foreign country, while we measure 
distance from individual states to countries. 
  
Overall, the empirical results for these additional variables, with the exception of FDIc, provide 
little help in understanding the intensive margin. 
30 See Lawless (2010), Table 7. 
31 Lawless (2010) found statistical significance for Phones. 27 
 
Estimates Using all State Data Simultaneously.  The results of estimating the intensive 
margin using state-level data simultaneously for both the simple and extended gravity models are 
listed in Table 13.  Column (1) lists the results for the simple gravity model that also controls for 
gross state product.  In addition to finding that larger importing countries tend to have, from the 
perspective of a given state, larger exports per firm and that larger distances between the 
exporting state and importing country reduce exports per firm, the results show that larger states 
tend to have larger exports per firm than smaller states. 
For the extended gravity model that also controls for gross state product, numerous 
additional variables were found to be statistically significant.  This result is in stark contrast to 
the estimates generated by estimating each state separately.  At the same time, the variables in 
the simple model – GDPc, Distances,c, and GSPAs – remained statistically significant and, with 
the exception of GDPc, the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates were relatively unchanged.  
The size of the coefficient estimate on GDPc declined from 0.43 to 0.29.  Turning to the results 
for the additional variables in the extended model, foreign direct investment was a positive, 
statistically significant determinant of exports per firm.  A similar comment can be made for 
population density in the foreign country.  Meanwhile, English as an official language, mobile 
phone subscriptions, and trade fees were each a negative, statistically significant determinant of 
the intensive margin using state-level data.  
The results in columns (3) and (4) show the effects of replacing gross state product with 
dummy variables for each of the states using Wyoming as the base.  Similar to the extensive 
margin results, the coefficient estimates and statistical significance are virtually identical when 
one compares the results in column (3) with column (1) and the results in column (4) with 
column (2). 28 
 
  Once again, the estimates for the coefficients for the state dummy variables are not 
reported, but are available upon request.  A comparison of the estimated state fixed effects for 
the models in columns (3) and (4) are nearly identical as the simple correlation is virtually one.  
Next, regressions were run to see what state characteristics were driving the results.  Recall that 
the independent variables used in these regressions are listed and defined in Table 8. 
  I began by running a bivariate regression using gross state product as the independent 
variable to explain the fixed-effects estimates generated by the regression reported in column (4) 
of Table 13.  The results are reported in column (1) of Table 14.  Obviously, state size, GSPAs, is 
a key determinant explaining roughly 16 percent of the variation.  Next, I explored the effects of 
other potential determinants.  Representative results are reported in column (2) of Table 14. 
  First, two of the measures attempting to capture the skill levels were found to be 
statistically significant.  Per capita gross state product, GSPAPCs, was found to be a positive, 
statistically significant determinant.  Thus, relative to other states, higher per capita levels of 
gross state product tend to be associated with increased exports per firm.  Meanwhile, the 
fraction of a state’s population 25 and older with a high school degree, School1s was a negative, 
statistically significant determinant, while the fraction with an undergraduate degree or more was 
not statistically significant.  A number of geographically-based measures of state characteristics 
– Borders, Coasts, and Popdensitys - were also examined; however, none were found to be 
statistically significant.  Finally, similar to the results for the extensive margin, state foreign trade 




5. Discussion and Concluding Comments 
My analysis addresses a topic of much interest in international trade, the potential determinants 
of extensive and intensive trade margins.  Relying on a theoretically-based approach in Lawless 
(2010), I reinforce the importance of distinguishing between the two margins.  Not surprisingly, 
the standard independent variables for gravity-based models, GDPc and Distances,c, are key 
explanatory variables for both trade margins.  Moreover, the extensive margin is relatively more 
responsive than the intensive margin to percentage changes in these variables.  In addition, 
numerous other variables capturing other dimensions of trade costs, such as the importance of a 
common language, communications infrastructure, geography, and government regulations and 
documents, affect the extensive trade margin. 
Similar to Lawless (2010), I find few consistent results for explaining the intensive trade 
margin in the state-by-state regressions.  However, the single-equation estimation of the 
intensive trade margin did produce a number of results at odds with Lawless (2010).  
Specifically, I find three variables to be statistically significant determinants of the intensive 
margin.  Both the official use of English and fees associated with crossing the border were found 
to have negative effects, while population density was found to have a positive effect.   
A noteworthy contribution is that this paper extends understanding of the determinants of 
the extensive and intensive trade margins by highlighting the empirical importance of U.S. 
foreign direct investment.  The number of exporters to a country and exports per firm at the state 
level to a country are related positively to U.S. foreign direct investment in that country.  Thus, 
U.S. foreign direct investment is complementary to both trade margins at the state level. 30 
 
This paper also extends empirical knowledge by using state-level trade data.  Both the 
state-by-state regressions and the single-equation regressions produce new results.  First, this 
research provides information on the diversity across states with respect to the impacts of the 
various independent variables on both trade margins.  For virtually every independent variable, 
but especially for all variables other than the gross domestic product and distance, one observes 
large differences in both the parameter estimates and statistical significance across states. 
Second, it provides information suggesting explanations for differences across states.  
Not surprisingly, state size is important for both trade margins.  Meanwhile, for the extensive 
margin, differences across states can be attributed to per capita gross state product and sharing a 
border with Canada or Mexico, with both having a negative impact, and state population density 
and foreign trade missions, with both having a positive impact.  For the intensive margin, 
differences across states can be attributed to achieving a high school diploma or more, which has 
a negative impact, and per capita gross state product and foreign trade mission, with both having 
a positive impact.  Overall, our search for differences across states suggests that more research 
attention should be focused on trade missions and other forms of promotional activity.  
The current paper has highlighted some key advantages of using state-level trade data to 
individual countries.  Future research will illustrate another advantage.  The use of state-country 
data also will allow us to examine individual countries separately.  Thus, we can examine the 
determinants of the extensive and intensive trade margins for a specific country.  
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Variables for Trade Margin Regressions: Abbreviation and Definition 
Name      Definition 
Firmss,c     number of firms in state s exporting to the country c  
Exportss,c    exports from state s to country c  
Exportsperfirms,c  average exports per firm from state s to country c 
Distances,c    distance (kilometers) from largest city in state s to largest city in country c 
GSPs      gross state product of state s ($thousands) 
GDPc      gross domestic product of country c ($m) 
FDIc       value ($m) of U.S. foreign direct investment in country c 
Englishc    if English is an official language of country c, then value is 1; otherwise 0 
Phonesc    mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people in country c 
Internetc    internet users per 100 people in country c 
Popdensityc    population per square kilometer in country c 
Landareac    area in square kilometers in country c  
TradeFreedomc  index measuring the extent to which traded goods are unaffected by tariff 
and non-tariff barriers - higher values indicate lower barriers in country c 
Tradedocumentsc  number of documents per a standardized shipment in country c required 
for import clearance by government ministries, customs authorities, 
terminal authorities, health and technical control agencies, and banks 
Timeprocessc   days to move a standardized shipment through country c’s port 
Tradefeesc  official, administrative fees in dollars per imported container in country c  
including the costs for documents, administrative fees for customs 
clearance and technical control, customs brokers fees, terminal handling 
charges, and inland transportation - tariffs and trade taxes are excluded 
Legalc  measures the perceptions to which agents in country c have confidence in 
and follow rules/laws – higher percentile ranks indicate better governance 
CorruptionControlc   measures the perceptions that agents in country c have concerning the 
extent to which public power is exercised for public rather than private 
interests - higher percentile ranks indicate better governance 
Foreignborns,c   number of foreign born by country c in a state s 34 
 
Table 2       
  Summary Statistics       
 
Name  Mean 
Range* 
  Minimum  Maximum 
  State-County Variables 
  Firmss,c  116.0  0  16,505 
      (1646 pairs)  (California-Canada) 
  Exportss,c  113,233,436.9  0  48,034,934,784 
      (3836 pairs)  (Texas-Mexico) 
  Exportsperfirms,c  341,570.8  3,198.2  43,516,696 
      (Nevada-St. Lucia)  (Louisiana-Syria) 
  Distances,c  9,480.3  334.0  19,497.3 
      (Michigan-Canada)  (Hawaii-Botswana) 
  Foreignborns,c  8,011.4  0  3,928,701 
      (56 pairs)  (California-Mexico) 
         
  State Specific Variables 
  GSPs  251,851,864.7  22,925,322  1,673,106,944 
      (Vermont)  (California) 
         
  Country Specific Variables 
  GDPc  182,489.2  106.5  4,224,969.5 
      (Kiribati)  (Japan) 
  FDIc  13,880.4  -16.5  393,540.4 
      (Madagascar)  (United Kingdom) 
  Englishc**  Na  0  1 
         
  Phonesc  55.8  0  151 
      (Myanmar)  (Luxembourg) 
  Internetc  22.5  0.2  87.6 
      (Myanmar)  (Iceland) 
  Popdensityc  296.8  ≈0  17,727 
      (Greenland)  (Macao) 
  Landareac  629,090.0  28  16,377,740 
      (Macao)  (Russia) 
  TradeFreedomc  68.5  17  90 
      (Bahamas)  (Hong Kong) 
  Tradedocumentsc  10.0  2  20 
      (Hong Kong & 
Kiribati) 
(Rwanda) 
  Timeprocessc  34.8  3  139 
      (Singapore)  (Uzbekistan) 
 35 
 
Tradefeesc  1,374.5  322.5  4,421.0 
      (Singapore)  (Zimbabwe) 
  Legalc  48.3  0.5  100 
      (Afghanistan)  (Iceland) 
  CorruptionControlc  49.1  0.5  100 
      (Myanmar)  (Finland) 
 
          * The geographic unit exhibiting the value is in parentheses 
  ** English (dummy) : Of 190 countries, 57 (30 percent) use English as an official 
language while 133 do not 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Theoretical Predictions with Lawless’ (2010) Results
† 
Independent    Extensive Margin            Intensive Margin 
Variable    Firms  Lawless    Exportsperfirm  Lawless 
GDPc      +  +ss      ?                         +ss   
FDIc      ?        ? 
Distances,c    -  -ss      ?      -ss     
Englishc (1 for yes)  +  +ss      ?      -insig 
Phones  c    +  +ss      ?      -ss 
Internetc    +  +ss      ?      -ss 
Popdensityc    +  +ss      ?      -insig 
Landareac    -  -ss      ?      +insig 
TradeFreedomc  +        ? 
Tradedocumentsc  -  -ss      ?      +insig 
Timeprocessc    -  -ss      ?      +insig 
Tradefeesc    -  -ss      ?      +insig 
Legalc     +        ? 
CorruptionControlc  +        ? 
Foreignborns,c   +        ? 
 
† The symbols for the theoretical predictions indicate an expected positive or negative 
relationship or one indicated by “?” that could be positive, negative, or zero.  My interpretation 
of Lawless’ overall results are indicated by the empirical sign and whether the relationship is 
statistically significant or not (i.e., insig).  If the variable was not included in Lawless’ study, 
then the result is left blank.   37 
 
Table 4 




























GDP  0.74***  0.79***  0.74***  0.78***  0.72***  0.76***  0.79***  0.77***  0.59***  0.66***  0.71***  0.68*** 
Distance  -1.20***  -2.27***  -0.75***  -0.99***  -1.03***  -0.76***  -0.71***  -0.78***  -1.99***  -1.06***  -4.24***  -1.17*** 
Constant  6.11***  12.77***  2.52**  3.05***  7.86***  2.28*  1.59  0.78  17.31***  7.00***  32.44***  5.47*** 
Dispersion  -0.28**  0.01  -0.57***  -0.25*  -0.22**  -0.48***  -0.25**  -0.16  0.01  -0.28***  0.09  -0.23 
Pseudo R
2  0.17  0.25  0.19  0.18  0.12  0.18  0.16  0.18  0.10  0.13  0.23  0.18 

























0.77***  0.76***  0.72***  0.70***  0.80***  0.67***  0.70***  0.62***  0.80***  0.76***  0.73***  0.75*** 
-0.90***  -0.86***  -1.01***  -0.79***  -1.04***  -1.02***  -0.81***  -0.58***  -0.74***  -0.75***  -0.79***  -1.18*** 
4.87***  3.50***  4.49***  2.83***  4.16***  5.51***  1.95*  2.36***  2.51**  2.66**  3.37***  5.19*** 
-0.31***  -0.21*  -0.44***  -0.69***  -0.14  -0.27**  -0.53***  -0.60***  -0.35***  -0.19*  -0.40***  -0.30** 
0.14  0.16  0.18  0.19  0.16  0.15  0.22  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.18 



























0.78***  0.82***  0.74***  0.79***  0.87***  0.72***  0.73***  0.75***  0.76***  0.66***  0.78***  0.77***  0.71*** 
-1.03***  -1.45***  -0.81***  -1.16***  -0.54***  -0.91***  -0.94***  -0.80***  -0.93***  -0.97***  -0.90***  -0.78***  -1.11*** 
4.61***  5.27***  1.90*  4.67**  -1.52  5.42***  2.58*  4.64***  4.58***  3.14**  4.36***  1.87  6.10*** 
-0.20*  -0.20  -0.65***  -0.21  -0.23*  -0.28***  -0.44***  -0.31***  -0.27***  -0.68***  -0.25**  -0.38***  -0.19 
0.16  0.25  0.22  0.18  0.18  0.13  0.22  0.13  0.15  0.25  0.15  0.18  0.16 



























0.76***  0.83***  0.75***  0.77***  0.75***  0.72***  0.75***  0.77***  0.66***  0.70***  0.86***  0.77***  0.82*** 
-0.89***  -0.74***  -0.96***  -1.09***  -1.03***  -0.78***  -0.83***  -0.58***  -0.66***  -1.13***  -0.57***  -1.10***  -0.81*** 
4.53***  0.20  4.34***  2.83*  5.04***  4.86***  2.67*  -1.12  2.92***  6.93***  -2.53**  5.91***  -1.13 
-0.33***  0.06  -0.31***  -0.27  -0.21*  -0.54***  0.50***  -0.66***  -0.52***  -0.32***  -0.37**  -0.30***  -0.23 
0.15  0.17  0.16  0.23  0.15  0.14  0.19  0.23  0.15  0.16  0.23  0.15  0.26 
190  190  190  190  190  190  190  190  190  190  190  190  190 
 
 
Note:  Statistical significance:  1% level -- ***; 5% level -- **; 10% level -- *. 38 
 
Table 5 




















GDP  0.47***  0.54***  0.55***  0.44***  0.50***  0.51***  0.45***  0.42*** 
Distance  -0.94***  -2.66***  -0.71***  -0.82***  -0.79***  -0.50***  -0.47***  -0.62*** 
FDI  0.13***  0.14*  0.10***  0.20***  0.13***  0.13***  0.19***  0.19*** 
English  0.49***  0.12  0.47***  0.30**  0.35***  0.45***  0.24*  -0.05 
Phones  0.05  -0.06  0.10  0.05  0.13**  0.17**  0.19***  -0.03 
Popdensity  0.09**  0.02  0.06  0.03  0.11***  0.04  0.13***  0.11** 
Tradefees  -0.58***  -0.36  -0.31***  -0.65***  -0.48***  -0.44***  -0.46***  -0.66*** 
Constant  9.06***  20.86***  4.76***  7.79***  9.33***  3.81**  3.76**  5.99*** 
Dispersion  -1.09***  -0.24  -1.21***  -1.22***  -0.95***  -1.38***  -1.18***  -0.81*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.21  0.25  0.22  0.25  0.16  0.23  0.21  0.22 



















0.27***  0.38***  0.47***  0.41***  0.46***  0.48***  0.43***  0.43***  0.41*** 
-1.70***  -0.75***  -3.48***  -1.05***  -0.56***  -0.62***  -0.70***  -0.61***  -0.67*** 
0.16***  0.15***  0.19***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.23*** 
0.39**  0.35***  0.50**  0.71***  0.21  0.37**  0.26**  0.36***  0.22 
0.18**  0.10  0.04  0.01  0.16**  0.18**  0.05  0.01  0.08 
-0.05  0.05  0.20***  0.02  0.07*  0.09**  0.02  0.01  0.02 
-0.60***  -0.44***  -0.52**  -0.51***  -0.38***  -0.43***  -0.53***  -0.39***  -0.60*** 
20.54***  8.60***  28.95***  9.56***  5.68***  5.09***  7.07***  5.52***  7.19*** 
-0.45***  -1.10***  -0.75***  -1.40***  -0.98***  -0.89***  -1.29***  -1.52***  -0.92*** 
0.12  0.18  0.28  0.25  0.17  0.20  0.23  0.24  0.21 























0.31***  0.39***  0.48***  0.54***  0.50***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.42*** 
-0.75***  -0.61***  -0.42***  -0.43***  -0.58***  -0.50***  -1.00***  -0.78***  -1.25*** 
0.23***  0.20***  0.11***  0.13***  0.18***  0.16***  0.14***  0.19***  0.26*** 
0.23  0.58***  0.22*  0.24**  0.12  0.27**  0.30*  0.37**  0.79*** 
-0.07  -0.02  -0.10  0.22***  0.00  0.11*  0.06  0.04  0.13 
-0.04  0.03  0.05  0.13***  0.07*  0.07*  0.03  0.04  -0.09** 
-0.46***  -0.41***  -0.40***  -0.48***  -0.49***  -0.42***  -0.69***  -0.60***  -0.72*** 
9.01***  4.64***  4.54***  3.48**  5.80***  4.78***  10.14***  8.36***  10.69*** 
-0.82***  -1.72***  -1.29***  -1.26***  -0.82***  -1.25***  -0.98***  -0.96***  -1.71*** 
0.17  0.28  0.20  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.22  0.20  0.35 




















0.42***  0.44***  0.50***  0.46***  0.60***  0.55***  0.49***  0.55***  0.48*** 
-0.65***  -0.84***  -0.29***  -0.66***  -1.06  -0.55***  -0.72***  -1.00***  -0.61*** 
0.19***  0.20***  0.19***  0.15***  0.13***  0.09**  0.14***  0.08*  0.17*** 
0.39***  0.57***  0.34***  0.14  0.65***  0.31**  0.11  0.57***  0.18 
-0.06  0.21**  0.23***  0.11  -0.15  0.17**  -0.02  -0.21**  0.13* 
0.02  -0.02  0.06  0.10**  0.07  0.12**  0.10**  -0.02  0.06 
-0.44***  -0.72***  -0.60***  -0.47***  -0.55***  -0.47***  -0.53***  -0.40***  -0.56*** 
9.01***  4.64***  4.54***  3.48**  5.80***  4.78***  10.14***  8.36***   7.01*** 
-0.82***  -1.72***  -1.29***  -1.26***  -0.82***  -1.25***  -0.98***  -0.96***  -1.03*** 
0.17  0.28  0.20  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.22  0.20  0.19 





















0.39***  0.48***  0.45***  0.40***  0.42***  0.48***  0.44***  0.38*** 
-0.45***  -0.85***  -0.56***  -0.62***  -0.72***  -1.00***  -0.75***  -0.50*** 
0.25***  0.18***  0.19***  0.25***  0.19***  0.15***  0.17***  0.22*** 
0.14  0.44***  0.22*  0.34**  0.08  0.46***  0.35**  0.05 
-0.08  -0.04  0.11*  0.17*  0.03  0.11  0.08  0.01 
-0.07*  -0.00  0.08**  0.13**  0.08*  -0.01  0.08*  -0.03 
-0.55***  -0.73***  -0.47***  -0.72***  -0.53***  -0.73***  -0.52***  -0.22** 
5.71***  9.95***  5.99***  5.58***  7.60***  8.75***  7.62***  5.98*** 
-1.32***  -1.18***  -1.15***  -0.92***  -1.04***  -1.31***  -0.94***  -1.08*** 
0.23  0.22  0.19  0.24  0.19  0.28  0.19  0.16 















0.52***  0.43***  0.49***  0.53***  0.54***  0.49***  0.39*** 
-0.68***  -0.49***  -0.49***  -0.86***  -0.40***  -0.72***  -0.95*** 
0.12***  0.17***  0.08**  0.11***  0.19***  0.14***  0.27*** 
0.55***  0.36***  0.08  0.68***  0.25  0.33***  0.65*** 
0.10  0.17**  0.03  0.07  -0.02  0.14**  -0.01 
-0.00  0.04  0.07*  0.03  0.05  0.06  -0.02 
-0.61***  -0.57***  -0.36***  -0.63***  -0.52***  -0.52***  -0.49** 
6.58***  3.63***  4.68***  9.30***  1.54***  7.18***  6.22*** 
-1.50***  -2.09***  -1.06***  -1.19***  0.99***  -1.15***  -1.15*** 
0.24  0.31  0.18  0.21  0.26  0.20  0.31 
137  137  137  137  137  137  137 




Summary of Results: Extended Gravity Model for Extensive Margin 
Independent      Sign        Statistical Significance 
Variables    Positive  Negative    Positive  Negative 
GDP            50            0            50             0 
FDI             50            0            50            0 
Distance            0            50              0         50 
English           49             1            36            0 
Phones             37           13            16            1 
Popdensity            39           11             18            2 
Tradefees              0           50      0           49   42 
 
Table 7 
Single Equation Results for Extensive Margin 
Independent           Negative Binomial Coefficient Estimates 
Variable      (1)      (2)      (3)      (4) 
GDP      0.74***  0.46***  0.74***  0.46*** 
Distance    -1.05***  -0.83***  -0.96***  -0.75*** 
FDI          0.16***      0.16*** 
English        0.36***      0.35*** 
Phones         0.08***      0.06*** 
Popdensity        0.05***      0.05*** 
Tradefees        -0.51***      -0.50*** 
GSPA      1.22***  1.21*** 
Constant    -17.99***  -14.89***  1.17***  4.13*** 
Dispersion    -0.10***  -0.64***  -0.25***  -0.89*** 
Pseudo R
2    0.18    0.21    0.20    0.23 
Sample Size    9500    6850    9500    6850 
Fixed Effects    no    no    yes    yes 
 




Variables for Fixed-Effect Regressions: Abbreviation and Definition 
Name      Definition 
GSPAs     gross state product of state s ($) 
GSPAPCs    per capita gross state product of state s ($) 
School1s   percentage of state population 25 and older with a high school degree or 
more 
School2s   percentage of state population 25 and older with a bachelor’s degree or 
more 
Coasts  states with a coastline equal 1, otherwise 0; coastal states border water or 
territorial seas, but not the Great Lakes 
Borders  states with a land or water border with Canada or Mexico equal 1, 
otherwise 0 
Popdensityss    population per square kilometer in state s 
Trademissions  number of individual foreign trade missions from a state between 2000 




Explaining Extensive Margin Fixed-Effects Estimates 
Independent       OLS Coefficient Estimates 
Variable      (1)    (2) 
GSPA        0.004***  0.004*** 
GSPAPC          -0.026* 
Border           -0.477*** 
Popdensitys          0.003** 
Trademission          0.059** 
Constant      1.971***  2.611*** 
Adjusted R
2      0.62    0.70 
Sample Size      50    50 
 
Note:  Statistical significance:  1% level -- ***; 5% level -- **; 10% level -- *. 45 
 
Table 10 




























GDP  0.42***  0.49***  0.55***  0.50***  0.32***  0.52***  0.51***  0.53***  0.29***  0.33***  0.33***  0.53*** 
Distance  -0.73***  -2.11**  0.04  -0.18  -0.06  -0.37**  -0.19  0.02  -0.34***  -0.45***  -1.74**  -0.29 
Constant  14.31***  26.05**  5.48***  8.07***  9.19***  8.89***  7.85***  5.71***  11.74***  12.75***  22.89***  8.19*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.39  0.44  0.54  0.60  0.50  0.64  0.65  0.40  0.50  0.52  0.23  0.47 

























0.41***  0.51***  0.50***  0.58***  0.62***  0.42***  0.51***  0.37***  0.44***  0.45***  0.42***  0.49*** 
-0.13  -0.53***  -0.38***  -0.46**  -0.59***  -0.97***  -0.09  -0.06  -0.17  -0.52***  -0.34**  -0.62*** 
8.88***  11.09***  10.14***  9.95***  10.34***  17.45***  6.32***  8.19***  8.54***  11.72***  10.32***  12.30*** 
0.57  0.67  0.69  0.59  0.64  0.31  0.53  0.47  0.51  0.56  0.50  0.41 



























0.47***  0.58***  0.52***  0.54***  0.48***  0.32***  0.39***  0.35***  0.38***  0.21**  0.50***  0.39***  0.43*** 
-0.47***  0.33  -0.40**  -0.09  -0.21  -0.21*  -0.31  -0.45***  -0.62***  0.05  -0.50***  -0.03  -0.19 
10.70***  1.43  9.71***  6.12***  7.75***  10.32***  9.54***  12.26***  13.55***  9.32***  11.00***  7.61***  8.93** 
0.57  0.44  0.52  0.56  0.56  0.42  0.35  0.47  0.45  0.09  0.66  0.37  0.36 



























0.39***  0.41***  0.40***  0.53***  0.48***  0.32***  0.39***  0.62***  0.42***  0.51***  0.71***  0.45***  0.60 
-0.61***  -0.49***  -0.29**  -0.09  -0.63***  -0.49***  -0.68***  -0.63***  -0.42***  -0.39  -0.11  -0.33***  -0.73 
13.00***  10.91***  10.53***  6.07***  12.83***  13.98***  13.27***  9.46***  11.54***  10.16***  4.89***  10.09***  10.30 
0.57  0.40  0.54  0.54  0.51  0.41  0.42  0.72  0.56  0.57  0.62  0.65  0.10 
161  88  126  60  121  172  111  77  142  136  60  144  19 
 
 

























GDP  0.21  0.53*  0.29***  0.57***  0.18***  0.34***  0.28***  0.35** 
Distance  -0.66***  -2.51**  0.21  -0.18  0.01  -0.12  -0.15  -0.05 
FDI  0.15*  -0.08  0.18***  -0.04  0.12***  0.15***  0.18***  0.22* 
English  0.34  -0.32  -0.17  -0.08  -0.14  -0.01  -0.14  -0.24 
Phones  0.06  0.28  -0.01  0.20  -0.13*  -0.06  -0.05  -0.12 
Popdensity  0.15*  0.28*  0.12*  0.08  0.04  0.05  0.16***  0.16 
Tradefees  -0.07  -0.02  0.02  0.22  -0.10  -0.02  -0.26  -0.08 
Constant  14.62***  27.52**  5.00  4.87**  10.20***  7.66***  9.98***  6.96* 
Adjusted R
2  0.45  0.44  0.57  0.65  0.60  0.69  0.71  0.44 



















0.16***  0.12**  0.14  0.38***  0.37***  0.31***  0.42***  0.53***  0.36*** 
-0.33***  -0.36***  -1.77*  -0.24  -0.05  -0.45***  -0.28*  -0.43**  -0.45** 
0.09***  0.12***  0.16  0.15  0.04  0.14***  0.04  0.04  0.20*** 
0.01  -0.13  -0.66  0.22  0.26*  -0.10  -0.05  0.32  -0.05 
-0.10  -0.03  -0.09  -0.45**  -0.05  0.01  0.19*  -0.01  -0.05 
-0.01  0.06  0.26*  0.23**  -0.08*  0.04  -0.01  -0.01  0.11 
-0.06  -0.29**  -0.16  -0.62**  0.16  -0.12  -0.01  -0.22  -0.17 
13.32***  15.24***  24.64***  13.38***  7.66***  12.21***  9.12***  11.57***  11.51*** 
0.49  0.62  0.24  0.58  0.64  0.70  0.67  0.60  0.70 
























0.43***  0.46***  0.20***  0.19**  0.10  0.27***  0.30**  0.33**  0.32* 
-1.02***  -0.16  -0.07  0.05  -0.32**  -0.16  -0.64***  -0.51***  0.37 
0.04  0.06  0.19***  0.19***  0.24***  0.15***  0.19*  0.11*  0.34* 
-0.23  0.13  0.09  -0.43**  -0.51***  0.08  -0.23  -0.25  -0.41 
-0.70***  -0.16  -0.27***  -0.04  -0.06  -0.05  -0.39**  -0.20  -0.55* 
0.07  0.21***  -0.01  0.14**  -0.06  0.07  0.12  0.06  0.13 
-0.11  -0.03  0.13  0.15  -0.11  -0.00  -0.12  0.17  -0.60* 
20.73***  6.90**  9.06***  6.59***  13.45***  9.35***  15.16***  11.33***  6.99 
0.30  0.55  0.57  0.60  0.64  0.57  0.48  0.52  0.49 





















0.30***  0.34***  0.42***  0.23***  0.30*  0.25***  0.09  0.59***  0.42*** 
-0.29  0.22  -0.33*  -0.16  -0.14  -0.42**  -0.59***  -0.07  -0.45*** 
0.14*  0.24***  -0.00  0.09*  0.14  0.08*  0.17***  -0.33***  0.03 
0.02  0.02  -0.09  -0.03  0.66**  0.07  -0.42**  0.46  -0.28* 
-0.20  -0.01  0.26*  -0.11  -0.01  -0.13  -0.08  0.17  0.13 
0.03  -0.04  0.11*  0.09*  0.09  0.11*  0.14***  -0.14  0.02 
0.11  0.29  -0.28  0.37***  0.21  -0.09  -0.14  0.08  -0.15 
10.26***  1.97  9.95***  7.75***  5.93  13.14***  16.21***  7.98**  11.57*** 
0.44  0.70  0.59  0.51  0.44  0.49  0.55  0.26  0.73 























0.18**  0.32***  0.27***  0.21*  0.24***  0.54***  0.46***  0.14**  0.25** 
0.11  -0.08  -0.42***  -0.44**  -0.25*  -0.25  -0.59***  -0.44***  -0.93*** 
0.20***  0.17**  0.10***  0.15*  0.10*  0.03  0.02  0.16***  0.10 
-0.14  -0.37  0.00  -0.14  -0.25  0.17  -0.28  -0.27  0.54** 
-0.12  -0.53***  -0.02  -0.09  -0.11  0.28  -0.12  -0.33***  -0.24* 
-0.12*  0.11  0.07  0.18**  0.06  0.14*  0.16***  -0.09*  0.09 
0.33  -0.40*  -0.10  -0.05  -0.44***  -0.44*  -0.34*  -0.08  -0.32 
5.91**  12.58***  12.44***  11.62***  14.67***  8.29***  14.88***  16.83***  19.15*** 
0.44  0.47  0.71  0.37  0.56  0.57  0.64  0.52  0.49 














0.47***  0.42***  0.38***  0.37**  0.44***  -0.09 
-0.54***  -0.62***  -0.36  -0.06  -0.34**  0.15 
0.16**  -0.01  0.13**  0.31**  0.00  0.72 
-0.29  -0.38**  -0.00  -0.24  -0.04  -1.04 
-0.09  -0.11  -0.36***  -0.48**  -0.14  -0.97 
0.06  0.14***  0.06  0.12  0.06  -0.26 
-0.39*  -0.03  -0.47**  -0.26  0.01  -0.76 
12.08***  13.52***  14.92***  9.15***  10.51***  15.00 
0.73  0.63  0.59  0.62  0.63  -0.02 
65  113  102  52  115  19 
Note:  Statistical significance:  1% level -- ***; 5% level -- **; 10% level -- *. 49 
 
Table 12 
Summary of Results: Extended Gravity Model for Intensive Margin 
Independent      Sign        Statistical Significance 
Variables    Positive  Negative    Positive  Negative 
GDP            49            1            45             0 
FDI             45            5            31            1 
Distance            7            43              0         26 
English           16            34              3            5 
Phones               9            41              2           11 
Popdensity            39            11             16            3 
Tradefees             13             37      1            950 
 
Table 13 
Single Equation Results for Intensive Margin 
Independent                    OLS Coefficient Estimates 
Variable      (1)      (2)      (3)      (4) 
GDP      0.43***  0.29***  0.43***  0.30*** 
Distance    -0.37***  -0.34***  -0.37***  -0.34*** 
FDI          0.12***      0.11*** 
English        -0.08**      -0.06* 
Phones         -0.14***      -0.14*** 
Popdensity        0.07***      0.07*** 
Tradefees        -0.08**      -0.08*** 
GSP      0.30***  0.30*** 
Constant    4.79***  6.17***  9.18***  10.43*** 
Adjusted R
2    0.45    0.47    0.54    0.57 
Sample Size    5664    4532    5664    4532 
Fixed Effects    no    no    yes    yes 
 





Explaining Intensive Margin Fixed-Effects Estimates 
Independent       OLS Coefficient Estimates 
Variable      (1)    (2) 
GSPA        0.0008***  0.0005* 
GSPAPC          0.0160* 
School1          -0.0850*** 
Trademission          0.0525*** 
Constant      1.1050***  7.4952*** 
Adjusted R
2      0.16    0.39 
Sample Size      50    50 
 
Note:  Statistical significance:  1% level -- ***; 5% level -- **; 10% level -- *. 
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Appendix – Results for an Extended Gravity Model for Total Exports 
  The results of estimating the simple and extended gravity models for total exports are 
presented and discussed in this appendix.  Prior results indicate that the determinants of the 
extensive and intensive margins differ.  Frequently, however, researchers are unable to separate 
total exports into extensive and intensive margins, so the results in this appendix allow one to see 
the overall impacts of selected variables on total exports. 
  The results of estimating the simple gravity model are presented in Table A-1.  The range 
of explanatory power ranges from a low of 0.22 for Wyoming to a high of 0.82 for Ohio.  For 48 
of the 50 states, the value of the adjusted R
2 exceeds 0.5.  Similar to the results for both the 
extensive and intensive margins, the export destination’s gross domestic product is a positive, 
statistically significant determinant of total exports.
32
  The results of estimating the extended gravity model are presented in Table A-2 and 
summarized in Table A-3.  The range of explanatory power ranges from 0.27 in Wyoming to 
0.89 in Ohio.  The results for export destination’s gross domestic product and distance change 
  The mean of these coefficient estimates is 
1.06, close to Lawless’ (2010) estimate of 0.94.  Similar to the results for the extensive margin, 
but not as strong, distance is a negative, statistically significant determinant of total exports.  The 
mean of these estimates for distance is -1.28, virtually identical to Lawless’ (2010) estimate of -
1.32.  The key to the fact that the results are not quite as strong is due to the results for 
relationship between distance and the intensive margin.  Recall that this relationship was 
generally negative (i.e., 46 of 50 states), but not always statistically significant (i.e., 29 of 46 
states). 
                                                 
32 Note that, for comparable models, the sum of the elasticities for the intensive and extensive margins for a specific 
variable, such as gross domestic product, is not equal to the elasticity for the total exports regression.  The reason is 
that the sample sizes differ for the intensive and extensive margins because of zeros and confidentiality reasons. 54 
 
very little from the results for the simple model.  The mean coefficients for these variables are 
0.72 and -1.07, respectively.  Similar to the results for the extensive margin, but not as strong, 
U.S. foreign direct investment is generally a positive, statistically significant determinant of total 
exports. 
Not surprisingly, the results for the other variables tend to be somewhat mixed because of 
the differing results that these variables had on the extensive and intensive margins.  The results 
for foreign direct investment illustrate this point.  For 48 of 50 states, foreign direct investment 
was related positively to total exports.  For the states with positive values, 40 states exhibited a 
statistically significant relationship, while for the states with negative values, one of the two 
states exhibited a statistically significant relationship.  Recall that the impact of foreign direct 
investment on the extensive margin was always positive and statistically significant and was 
nearly always positive for the intensive margin, but statistically significant for 31 of 45 states. 
Turning to the results for the remaining variables, the use of English as an official 
language was also related positively to total exports in most cases (i.e., 40 of 50 states), but this 
relationship was not generally statistically significant (i.e., 11 of 40 states).  Meanwhile, the 
communications infrastructure as reflected by mobile phone subscriptions exhibited a negative 
impact on total exports more often than a positive impact (34 versus 16).  This relationship was 
not generally statistically significant as only 1 of the 16 positive estimates and only 9 of the 34 
negative estimates was statistically significant.  Population density tended to show a positive 
relationship with total exports, but was statistically significant for only 18 of the 42 positive 
cases.  Finally, for every state the costs to import variable was related negatively to total exports 
and was statistically significant for 30 cases. 55 
 
Table A-1 



























GDP  1.00***  1.01***  1.23***  1.04***  1.04***  1.20***  1.18***  0.99***  0.84***  0.91***  0.80***  1.02*** 
Distance  -1.66***  -3.95**  -0.67**  -0.86***  -1.47***  -1.17***  -0.78***  -0.30  -2.28***  -1.52***  -4.61**  -1.30*** 
Constant  19.82***  38.74***  8.03***  11.19***  20.09***  12.29***  9.63***  6.18**  28.50***  20.55***  46.04***  14.52*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.63  0.65  0.76  0.77  0.76  0.78  0.79  0.55  0.69  0.74  0.51  0.62 

























1.12***  1.17***  1.07***  1.16***  1.27***  0.94***  1.03***  0.95***  1.17***  1.15***  1.05***  0.98*** 
-1.19***  -1.43***  -1.14***  -1.17***  -1.47***  -1.84***  -0.74***  -0.64***  -1.01***  -1.35***  -1.26**  -1.43*** 
15.47***  15.75***  14.07***  13.42***  14.59***  23.22***  8.89***  10.94***  12.42***  15.54***  15.83***  17.06*** 
0.77  0.79  0.81  0.74  0.75  0.57  0.68  0.72  0.77  0.77  0.70  0.57 



























1.12***  1.07***  1.08***  1.13***  1.19***  1.02***  0.89***  1.05***  1.05***  0.65***  1.23***  1.00***  1.05*** 
-1.47***  -0.39  -1.04***  -0.89**  -0.64**  -1.20***  -1.00**  -1.35***  -1.55***  -0.63  -1.51***  -0.60**  -1.14** 
16.48***  4.33  12.10***  9.82***  6.96***  16.27***  12.70***  17.87***  18.83***  12.78***  16.65***  9.32***  14.53** 
0.76  0.52  0.69  0.73  0.72  0.74  0.57  0.74  0.72  0.39  0.82  0.64  0.62 



























1.11***  0.99***  1.01***  0.96***  1.12***  1.00***  1.01***  1.20***  1.02***  1.17***  1.25***  1.10***  1.00* 
-1.54***  -0.91***  -1.06***  -0.68**  -1.56***  -1.33***  -1.36***  -1.26***  -1.08***  -1.38***  -0.29  -1.37***  -1.49 
18.03***  11.17***  14.60***  8.81***  18.17***  19.63***  15.83***  10.92***  14.91***  16.13***  2.96  16.62***  14.19 
0.75  0.62  0.72  0.60  0.72  0.74  0.67  0.81  0.78  0.75  0.69  0.81  0.22 
161  88  126  60  121  172  111  77  142  136  60  144  19 
 
Note:  Statistical significance:  1% level -- ***; 5% level -- **; 10% level -- *. 56 
 
Table A-2 





















GDP  0.56***  1.00**  0.82***  1.01***  0.69***  0.84***  0.78***  0.70*** 
Distance  -1.45***  -4.64**  -0.36  -0.91***  -0.91***  -0.59*  -0.62***  -0.51 
FDI  0.31***  -0.03  0.26***  0.06  0.25***  0.26***  0.29***  0.31* 
English  0.90**  -0.07  0.36  0.32  0.24  0.38  0.19  0.09 
Phones  -0.01  -0.20  0.14  0.17  0.00  0.03  0.08  -0.23 
Popdensity  0.22**  0.32  0.18*  0.08  0.17**  0.11  0.26***  0.24* 
Tradefees  -0.66*  -0.42  -0.27  -0.38  -0.62***  -0.41  -0.78***  -0.48 
Constant  24.03***  47.53**  8.40*  13.02***  20.70***  11.35***  14.46***  11.93** 
Adjusted R
2  0.73  0.65  0.78  0.83  0.87  0.83  0.86  0.58 




















0.45***  0.48***  0.52*  0.74***  0.85***  0.74***  0.82****  0.96***  0.76*** 
-2.01***  -1.12***  -4.90***  -1.30**  -0.69***  -1.06***  -0.90***  -1.06***  -1.10*** 
0.23***  0.27***  0.23  0.26*  0.19***  0.30***  0.17**  0.16  0.39*** 
0.44  0.31  -0.61  0.93**  0.61***  0.24  0.31  0.79**  0.25 
0.05  -0.05  0.03  -0.57**  0.04  0.10  0.19  -0.06  -0.06 
-0.02  0.14**  0.42**  0.18  0.01  0.10  0.00  -0.00  0.11 
-0.70***  -0.76***  -0.58  -1.07***  -0.31  -0.59**  -0.57**  -0.61**  -0.76** 
33.71***  24.65***  52.11***  24.30***  14.67***  18.43***  16.49***  17.80***  19.21*** 
0.73  0.86  0.51  0.72  0.85  0.85  0.84  0.79  0.83 
























0.65***  0.78***  0.61***  0.68***  0.59***  0.66***  0.65***  0.74***  0.61** 
-1.68***  -0.66**  -0.47**  -0.36  -0.92***  -0.61**  -1.46***  -1.35***  -0.31 
0.26*  0.23*  0.32***  0.32***  0.41***  0.31***  0.30**  0.28***  0.63*** 
0.09  0.64*  0.48*  -0.18  -0.17  0.29  0.22  0.17  0.09 
-0.84***  -0.27  -0.45***  0.15  -0.10  0.06  -0.53**  -0.21  -0.70 
0.04  0.23**  0.01  0.27***  -0.00  0.12  0.13  0.11  0.01 
-0.60  -0.45  -0.34  -0.38*  -0.71***  -0.40  -0.63*  -0.51*  -1.16** 
30.44***  12.23***  14.83***  10.81***  20.49***  14.21***  24.74***  21.44***  14.29** 
0.55  0.74  0.81  0.85  0.83  0.81  0.65  0.78  0.64 




















066***  0.69***  0.89***  0.66***  0.76***  0.68***  0.51***  1.01***  0.87*** 
-0.92***  -0.34  -0.68***  -0.80***  -0.98**  -0.92***  -1.26***  -0.82**  -1.09*** 
0.31***  0.43***  0.15  0.25***  0.32**  0.25***  0.33***  -0.29*  0.21*** 
0.52  0.69**  0.34  0.14  1.13***  0.40  -0.26  0.99**  -0.11 
-0.35*  -0.01  0.57***  -0.05  -0.28  -0.01  -0.17  -0.08  0.16 
0.03  -0.09  0.17*  0.20**  0.15  0.24***  0.28***  -0.23*  0.11 
-0.35  -0.06  -0.88***  -0.05  -0.33  -0.54**  -0.70***  -0.26  -0.78*** 
17.18***  7.20*  12.52***  14.97***  13.77***  19.30***  24.47***  15.51***  19.79*** 
0.72  0.86  0.81  0.81  0.73  0.82  0.81  0.49  0.89 
84  73  85  120  54  126  116  50  114 
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0.58***  0.67***  0.73***  0.50***  0.59***  0.86***  0.92***  0.56**  0.71*** 
-0.37  -0.65  -0.98***  -0.81***  -0.86***  -1.02***  -1.36***  -0.99***  -1.55*** 
0.40***  0.38***  0.27***  0.37***  0.29***  0.15  0.13  0.34***  0.20** 
0.25  0.05  0.31  0.36  -0.06  0.68  0.03  -0.16  1.22*** 
-0.27  -0.47**  0.02  -0.10  -0.23  0.12  -0.12  -0.40***  -0.22 
-0.20**  0.08  0.14**  0.25**  0.12  0.13  0.24***  -0.14*  0.07 
-0.15  -1.06***  -0.64***  -0.58*  -1.02***  -0.95***  -0.92***  -0.36  -0.88*** 
11.84***  20.41***  19.19***  16.19***  22.90***  16.90***  23.53***  23.92***  26.10*** 
0.72  0.76  0.88  0.69  0.79  0.66  0.80  0.81  0.76 




















0.79***  0.97***  0.89***  0.74***  0.85***  0.18 
-0.98***  -1.18***  -1.21**  -0.24  -1.01***  -0.51 
0.34***  0.02  0.24***  0.47***  0.18***  0.93 
0.01  -0.12  -0.61*  0.16  0.33  -0.46 
-0.00  -0.17  -0.32*  -0.79**  -0.14  -1.09 
0.03  0.21***  0.08  0.14  0.13*  -0.34 
-0.84***  -0.57**  -1.02***  -0.55  -0.56**  -1.49 
16.19***  20.02***  23.79***  11.01***  18.87***  23.20 
0.83  0.83  0.81  0.71  0.86  0.27 
65  113  102  52  115  19 
Note:  Statistical significance:  1% level -- ***; 5% level -- **; 10% level -- *. 59 
 
Table A-3 
Summary of Results: Extended Gravity Model for Total Exports 
Independent      Sign        Statistical Significance 
Variables    Positive  Negative    Positive  Negative 
GDP            50            0            49             0 
FDI            48            2            40             1 
Distance            0           50             0                  41 
English          40           10            11             0 
Phones           16            34              1            9 
Popdensity           42             8             18            3 
Tradefees             0           50                         0          30   
 
  